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ALL special sciences, the positive as well as the practical,
naturally seek incorporation into some one comprehensive
scheme of thought which embodies man's largest, and at the
same time most centralised, conception of the Whole of
things, which is his Philosophy or Rationale of the Uni-
verse. The striving after some such organic unity in
knowledge seems to be an universal law of human intelli-
gence. The attempt to grasp it prematurely, so introducing
an illusory unity in place of the real one, has been the
source both of much hasty scientific generalisation, and of
much obstinacy in cleaving to antiquated theories in the
face of newly-discovered or unfamiliar facts. But in itself
the striving is so far from being irrational, that it is difficult
to imagine any intelligence which it does not in some
measure dominate.
"We see the effect of this tendency not only in the co-
ordination and subordination of special departments under
some single comprehensive science—neurology, for instance,
under biology—but also in the conception of the greater and
more comprehensive sciences themselves, divided into the
two groups of positive and practical, depending, so far as
their cardinal or axiomatic conceptions are concerned, upon
the philosophical analysis of consciousness, as the original
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charter of their validity. kThis is true both of what we may
call the great ultimate positive sciences, mathematic, kine-
matic, dynamic, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology,
and also of the great ultimate practical sciences, namely,
logic, aesthetic, ethic, and theology. In all these sciences
alike, the fundamental ideas and conceptions, and therefore
also the hypotheses built upon these, must be such as to
endure the scrutiny of an analysis which separates what is
permanent and self-evident in all experience from assump-
tions which owe their seeming necessity only to long asso-
ciation and familiarity.
From this it follows that the organic unity of man's
knowledge as a vast whole must be established, if at all, by
philosophy. But philosophy would be wholly unable to
respond to the demand if it was not in the possession of a
field and of a method peculiar to itself, which guarantee it
an existence independent of the several sciences which it
brings together, and constitute it a special mode of know-
ledge distinguished from science, and yet directed to discover
truth of fact, not merely to effect a convenient arrangement
of facts discovered in other fields and by other methods.
In the latter case philosophy would itself be nothing more
than a luxury or convenience, varying with the purposes
which might happen to be entertained by the individuals
pursuing it.
Now the peculiar field of philosophy as contradis-
tinguished from science, a field which is special to it as
philosophy and yet common and universal, inasmuch as
co-extensive with the ground covered by the sciences taken
together, is consciousness; that is to say, the knowing of
existence contrasted and connected with its objective aspect,
namely, with things, persons, and their functions, taken as
existents already known, and appearing to be given imme-
diately to perception. These latter are the form of
experience with which the sciences deal. Philosophy alone
deals with the knowing or experience out of which that form
of experience arises which is the knowledge of these objects.
Knowing'as distinguished from Being, and yet connected with
Being as its object, is thus the field of philosophy—a field
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•which on this account is at once peculiar to itself and yet
common to all the sciences. For in marking it out
philosophy bases itself upon a distinction, within experi-
ence, which no other science draws. And its field being thus
marked out, the method which it pursues therein follows
from again applying the same distinction. It is the method
of subjective analysis of consciousness, watching for
assumptions and excluding them from the number of ulti-
mate elements of knowing, which it seeks to discover.
The field of philosophy—existence on its subjective side,
•or consciousness, contrasted and connected with existent
objects; the method of philosophy—analysis of that con-
sciousness without assumptions ; these are the properties by
which philosophy is constituted as an independent mode of
knowledge, enabling it to comprehend in a single view the
objects of the rest, and to do this by simple adherence to
the truth of immediately known fact, without any arbitrary
adoption of principle, or favourite purpose to be served by
the unification.
At the same time no other mode can transcend or be
more comprehensive than this. Knowing and Being are
•complementaries of each other, because consciousness is the
point of view which all knowledge necessarily occupies.
There may be Being which is not endowed with conscious-
ness, but there can be no Being of which we are wholly
unconscious, that is, which we do not think of as Being in
naming it, even though our next step may be to deny its
existence in the shape under which we thought of it. All
such distinctions, therefore, as that between things as they
are and appearances are minor distinctions falling within
this most comprehensive one. Consciousness embraces all
Being, and there is nothing beyond consciousness with which
it can be compared or by which it can in any way be limited'.
So much with respect to philosophy it has been necessary
to premise, in order to show the sense in which neurology
(or anything else) can be said to stand in relation to it,
neurology being taken as a special department of the com-
prehensive science of biology. Now nerve substance, the
organisation and functions of which are the objects of
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neurology, taken simply as a highly specialised form of
matter, stands in a very remote relation to philosophy.
True, philosophy has to account for the idea of matter, and
for the belief in a material world, out of the analysis of
consciousness spoken of above, and to Bhow the grounds
for and against the belief in its independent reality. But
this being done, the function of philosophy in that direction
is at an end. The laws of matter and of all the special
forms of it belong not to philosophy but to science, whatever
may be held concerning its character as a real existent.
And in this respect philosophy has nothing to do with any
form or mode of matter so highly specialised as nerve
substance.
The more specific relation, which as we shall see is a
very close one, between neurology as the science of nerve
substance and philosophy must therefore be sought in quite
a different direction, at the upper not the lower end, so
to speak, of the series of positive sciences. Neurology
examines that most complex and highly organised structure
in living beings, upon which consciousness depends, in all
forms and all degrees of it, from simple sentience and from
surmised latency, upwards to the most complex phenomena
of thought, emotion, and volition, and. to the most distinct
awareness possible to self-consciousness. Nerve substance
and neural phenomena are that highest portion of biology in
which the domains of biology and psychology overlap each
other, and in which all psychological explanations must
ultimately be sought.
The domains of biology and chemistry overlap each other
in one direction, as those of biology and psychology overlap
each other in another. The same substance is both chemical
in composition and living in operation. And again, the
same substance is both living in operation and conscious.
in. function. Whereby I do not mean to affix any specially
technical sense to the terms, composition, operation, and
function, but use them simply in order to indicate the
phenomena intended with brevity. The same phenomenon
of overlapping prevails throughout the whole series of
sciences including philosophy, just as a similar phenomenon
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is observable in the substances and forces of nature, and in
the states and processes which compose the varied stream of
consciousness as it comes to us in actual experience. The
•connection then between neurology and psychology is of the
closest. The states and processes of consciousness one and
all depend immediately upon states and processes of nerve
substance, or at any rate there is nothing to indicate the
presence of any intermediary. The two kinds of phenomena
are essentially different, one material, the other immaterial,,
and the latter are dependent concomitants of the former.
But it will be said : How does this close relation between
neurology and psychology affect the question of this paper,
namely, the relation between neurology and philosophy?
Or rather it may be asked : How is it compatible with the
view of philosophy taken above, seeing that philosophy was
there represented as having a position wholly independent
of science ? Consciousness, it may be said, was there held to
be the special field of philosophy; and here it is admitted
to be dependent on neural phenomena, the object of a
special science. If consciousness be dependent on the
functioning of nerve substance, must not philosophy be
dependent on the results of neurology ? If so, what becomes
of its special field and independent position ?
It is this very point which the present paper is intended
to elucidate. We find as a rule those psychologists who
have no definite philosophy, or who have only a theological
one, or who think that over and above science there is
nothing but religion, which is a matter solely between a man
and his God—we find, I say, psychologists of these varieties
very reluctant to admit as a fact the complete dependence of
consciousness on nerve process. Concomitance they will
admit, and even reciprocal dependence. But dependence of
consciousness on nerve process simply, without dependence
of nerve process on consciousness, this they hesitate to
affirm until the latter dependence shall be disproved in detail,
unless indeed their interest goes in no respect beyond an
interest in science. In all these cases, psychology—the last
and highest of the positive sciences—does duty for philosophy;
eo that in them to be materialist in psychology means being
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materialist in the fullest possible sense of the word. Hence
the importance of the point now under consideration for all
those who admit the complete dependence of consciousness
on nerve process, and at the same time wish to take such a
general view of the knowable universe as may properly be
entitled philosophical.
Turning then to the point under consideration, the
apparent difficulty which it raises is surmounted by showing
that the domains of psychology and philosophy overlap
each other, one portion of each being common to both, just
as in the cases of chemistry and biology, biology and
psychology. The common ground between biology and
psychology is covered by neurology, the science of that kind
of living matter which has consciousness immediately
depending on it. And psychology has necessarily to take
account of the phenomena of neurology, because they are
the immediate real conditions upon which consciousness
depends, and without reference to which no explanation
whatever of the origin and concatenation of process-contents
of consciousness would be forthcoming. The study of this
immediate relation between nerve process and consciousness
is properly designated as psycho-physic. And what remains
peculiar to psychology, over and above the psycho-physical
portion which it shares with neurology, is the discrimination
and study of the various processes of consciousness, both
severally and in combination with each other, such as sensa-
tion, perception, attention, memory, recollection, imagination,
appetition, thought, emotion, volition, and so on—of every-
thing, in short, which used to come under the head of
faculties, recently christened functions, of the mind.
Similarly the domains of psychology and philosophy over-
lap each other, but here with a difference arising from the
peculiar nature of the ground which they share in common,
and which, as already said, is consciousness in its totality.
The difficulty which is here raised, and which we have now
to surmount, is this. The whole of consciousness is common
to both, and thus prima facie what has been called over-
lapping, becomes co-incidence. Prima facie there is room
for one science only, not for the science of psychology and
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philosophy as well, unless we identify the one with the other.
The question is, how is it possible to establish the justice of
the terra overlapping as applied to this instance ? Or in
other words, how is it possible to maintain the distinctness
and independence of psychology and philosophy, while
admitting that the phenomena which they cover, the
phenomena of consciousness, are, in their whole extent,
common to both ?
The reply comes from the side of philosophy. It is given
by that distinction which, as was said above, philosophy
alone draws, and the truth of which is the title-deed of its
validity, the distinction within experience of Knowing and
Being. Every state or (better) process-content of conscious-
ness has a double aspect. In one aspect it forms part of
what we may figuratively call our subjective panorama of the
existent world; in the other it comes into and passes out of
existence, as itself an existent for a brief period, in dependence
on the nerve process which subserves it. Just as the genera-
tions of mankind are born, into life and pass away in death,
so the successive layers of consciousness rise into being and
pass away into nothingness, never to return. The layers
must of course be understood as sections, artificially dis-
tinguished by subsequent observation, in what we may
figuratively call the time-stream of consciousness, flowing
not from point to point in space, but from present to past in
time only. Thus, for instance, our perception of a single
fixed object in space, say a picture on the wall, looked at for
five minutes, consists really of a succession of etherial vibra-
brations beating on the retina and accompanied by sensation,
those vibrations which occurred at the beginning of the five
minutes having ceased to exist and condition sensations,
when those at the end of the five minutes are occurring.
Every kind of process-content of consciousness is alike in
this feature of successiveness; not only sensatibns of external
sense, but all sensations, emotions, images, memories,
associations, recollections, conceptions, attention, sense of
effort, thought, reasoning, comparison, conscious volition,
choice, and resolve, sense of beauty and deformity, of right
and wrong, of pleasure and pain, in all their countless qualita-
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tive and quantitative varieties. And yet all alike, being in
the usual phrase recalled or recallable in memory (though,
strictly speaking, a recall of one and the same state of
consciousness is impossible) go to form part of that subjective
panorama which is our knowledge of the existent or surmised
world, and thus together make up that aspect of conscious-
ness which we call knowing. All alike owe their genesis,
the order in which they actually occur at first, and also the
order in which they, or rather their similars, are finally dis-
posed, before the panorama which they constitute becomes
an intelligible picture, or deserves the name of knowledge in
the full sense, to the nerve processes which subserve them,
and which operate again and again in similar ways on the
occurrence of similar stimuli.
As the conscious life of an individual proceeds from
infancy onwards, his consciousness is thus continually
occurring in the form of a time-stream of many currents,
each current consisting of successive changes in conscious-
ness, thrown up and determined by nerve processes, of which
he is wholly unaware, unless and until he chance, in later
life, to become acquainted with physiological results. This
aspect or feature in consciousness—-I mean its dependent
aspect of genesis and determination by nerve process—is what
may be called consciousness as an Existent, and not as an
Existent merely, but also as a particular and individual
Existent, in spite of the universality which it possesses in its
other aspect or character of a Knowing. In its character of
an Existent it is attached to and dependent on some particular
and individual living body, one among many, each of which
may similarly be inferred to be the seat of a similar in-
dividual consciousness.
It is this existent aspect of consciousness which is the
object of psychology, since psychology as a positive science has
necessarily to busy itself with the laws of origin and history
of the phenomena which are its special field. Psychology,
therefore, has not to account for there being such a nature
as consciousness, for this is the primary datum of all
particular knowledge whatever, but, taking this nature as
already known, to account for the genesis and subsequent
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history of it in individual living beings, that is, in the form
of individual consciousnesses. And in order to do this it is
obvious, that psychology must also treat the nervous system
and process as realities or real existents, no less than con-
sciousness ; and yet our whole knowledge of these is part of,
and bound up with, our knowledge of the whole material
world, into the real existence of which it is beyond the
scope of psychology, as a special science, to enquire. This
it has to assume as already known, and known as different
from the consciousness which it is called in to account for.
A similar remark holds good in the case of those
psychologists who account for the genesis and history of
consciousness by the hypothesis of an immaterial agent, be
it Mind, Soul, or Ego, and whether alone or in conjunction
with a nervous-system. I mean that they, too, must assume
the existence of such an agent as a reality, and also, as in
the former case, a reality known as different from the
consciousness of which it is supposed to be the Subject.
Thus, whatever be the type of hypothesis adopted by
psychology, it is plain that a real existent or existents, of
some kind or other, must be hypothetically assumed, in
order to account for that other existent, consciousness,
jvhich is the object of the science. Whence can the know-
ledge of such hypothetical existents be derived ? Whence
the knowledge that consciousness is an existent ? Whence
the knowledge of the meaning of the term existence, or
of the very ideas of genesis, of history, of dependence, of
explanation by reference to real causes or conditions ? It is
evident that all this knowledge can be derived only from the
other aspect of consciousness, its aspect as a knowing or
subjective panorama of existence, some parts or features of
which must be prior to, and independent of, other more
particular ideas or more particular knowledge, which are
subsequently developed in or incorporated with it. For it
is plain that the panorama cannot, simply as such, be
credited with a power to make assumptions, as if it were
an individual person speculating on data already given to it.
But this half or aspect of consciousness is that which we
have seen that philosophy, which draws the distinction
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originally, claims for its special province, as distinguished
from that of psychology, which is a positive science. And it
is also evident that this province is something more than
a merely co-equal aspect or half of consciousness as a whole.
The knowledge of which it consists is not a knowledge of
its own province only; it is a knowledge of its own pro-
vince as contrasted with that of psychology; a knowledge
which, therefore, embraces both provinces and the nature
of the distinction between them. Hence it is that phi-
losophy, besides being the more specialised of the two, is
also the more comprehensive in its grasp of the phenomena
common to both. This is a relation which may be illus-
trated by what has often been remarked about space, I mean,
that a knowledge of what is called its third dimension alone
enables us to understand its second, or plane superficiality,
by furnishing a direction with which on the ascending side
it is in contrast.
The distinction between Knowing and Being, upon which
philosophy bases itself immediately, and upon which it shows
that psychology is based mediately, that is, by intervention
of the idea of real condition, which is itself derived from that
of real existent, is a necessary and inevitable one. I hope I
have gone some way towards showing that it is so. To go
farther would involve me too much in the analysis of con-
sciousness as a knowing, which would be an unfit topic for
the present occasion. The same must also be said of any
attempt to show how the knowledge of an external material
world arises from the time-stream of consciousness, which,
when spatially extended perceptions, visual perceptions for
instance, occur in it, becomes a panorama, and which in re-
lation to that real material world we may call subjective.
The relation which I wish to establish between neurology
and philosophy has psychology as its intermediary link.
Nerve process conditions consciousness as an existent, hence
psychology overlaps neurology. Consciousness as an existent
in dependence on nerve process is only known through con-
sciousness as a knowing, or subjective panorama of existence
generally, hence philosophy overlaps psychology. Assuming,
as I have here done, what seems to me the only working and
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workable hypothesis possible, namely, that consciousness as
an existent depends on nerve process, and not reciprocally,
the remaining difficulty is that which I. have tried to over-
come by showing that consciousness really has, and necessarily
has, the two aspects distinguished, but not separated, by the
line drawn as I have drawn it between Knowing and Being.
It is a line which passes, to speak figuratively, right through
the middle of every state or process-content of consciousness,
whether simple or complex. And on this line of demarca-
tion the whole of philosophical speculation may be said to
depend.
Take a simple illustration of its nature and necessity.
Suppose a candle to be set up in a dark room and subse-
quently lighted, and let the light of that candle represent
consciousness. The light has a double aspect, analogous to
that of consciousness. It illumines the room and the objects
in it, including the candle and the candle flame, and is itself
visible by its own light. Without it nothing of all this would
be visible at all. Here it corresponds to consciousness in its
aspect of a Knowing. But on the other hand, without the
room and the candle, and the match applied to its wick, the
light itself would not exist, and it exists no longer than for
the interval from the applying of the match to the burning
out of the candle, upon which it immediately depends. Here
is the same light in its character of a real existent. The
theory of the composition of the candle, the ignition, and
the gradual burning, is the neurology and psychology of the
light.
Thus the whole mechanism of consciousness considered
as an existent belongs to psychology, and the whole content
of consciousness considered as a knowledge of existence
belongs to philosophy. And if any one should be inclined to
suppose that this is a mere contention about words, and that
it is really indifferent whether we call either domain or both
by either name, the reply is, that the names are important
because, and only because, they mark an essential difference,
which cannot be ignored, between two kinds of problems
and two kinds of method, a difference therefore which it is
indispensable to keep well defined for the sake of clear and
consistent thinking.
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It is impossible to treat the mechanism of consciousness
clearly and satisfactorily, without first framing some working
hypothesis of the Subject or Agent of that mechanism. And
every such hypothesis must either be drawn from the crude
assumptions of traditional Animism, or else from the know-
ledge of real existents, guaranteed by a careful analysis of
the phenomena of consciousness without assumptions; that
is, of the phenomena considered, in the first instance, in
purposed abstraction from hypotheses of every kind con-
cerning their genesis. To begin by laying it down that man
consists of mind and body, or that knowledge depends on the
presence of Objects to a Subject, is to begin with assuming
the truth of the very conceptions which science has to
investigate and explain, and the adoption of which, as the
initial conceptions of an explanatory science, has already
entangled psychology in a labyrinth of confusion. For thence-
forward it is necessarily occupied, not as it should be with
explaining the phenomena of consciousness, their order and
history, by connecting them with the hypothesis adopted,
but with explaining in what sense the terms Mind and Subject
are not to be understood, if they are to be compatible with the
phenomena at all. It is occupied, in short, with endeavouring
to explain away, or avoid the necessity of employing, the very
assumptions which it has made as the basis of an explanation.
Common sense tells us that there are phenomena which we
ordinarily use these expressions to describe. The question
for psychology is, what are the real (but always phenomenal)
facts and laws, of which these expressions are the familiar
description.
But there is another consideration which exhibits in even
a stronger light the confusion of thought which inevitably
results from treating the content and the genesis of con-
sciousness, together and undistinguished, as the object-
matter of a single science, whether that science be called
psychology or philosophy. Consciousness taken in its
content, or as a Knowing, is a knowledge of existence
generally; all things are its object. But consciousness
taken in its genesis and history, or as an Existent, is an
existent of one particular kind only; material things and
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the physical forces of Nature being existents of other kinds.
Every single person's consciousness has both these characters.
And if they are confused, every single person must logically
hold the universe to be his own creation, since he must at
once generalise his individual agency and individualise his
general knowledge. My point is, not that this position is
absurd, though it undoubtedly is so, but that between such
a psychology (or philosophy) as this and other sciences, no
possible congruence can be brought about.
The true distinction, therefore, upon which all possible
harmony depends, whether between the sciences themselves,
or between them taken collectively, and that philosophical
branch of knowledge which unifies them, is the distinction
between consciousness as a content of experience and con-
sciousness in its genesis as an existent, which then gives
rise to the further distinction between consciousness as an
existent and its real conditions, as the primary distinction
between philosophy and psychology. This, I repeat, is not
the distinction between Mind and Body, nor that between
Subject and Object. These latter must be conceived as
existents only, real or imagined, and belong but to one half,
one member, of the true distinction between consciousness
and existents generally, consciousness itself having also a
distinct character as an existent. The true ultimate distinction
falls within consciousness itself. And on this basis all the
other sciences find their place and their validity on exactly
the same footing as psychology itself finds it, when treating
of consciousness as an existent.
Mind and nerve substance are rival claimants for the
office of being the proximate real condition of consciousness.
The question is, What is known about their reality and
respective fitness for the office claimed? Of mind I venture
to say nothing whatever is known, neither its nature nor its
reality. Consequently it can have no fitness for the office
at all. It is a fiction of the fancy, tracing its pedigree to
the animistic theories of pre-historic times, before anything
was known of the more recondite properties of nerve and
brain. Analyse the content of consciousness, the subjective
panorama of existence, in which the title-deeds of all our
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knowledge are to be found, and nowhere will you find
evidence of any entity or agency answering to the terms
mind and mental, psyche and psychical. Everywhere there
is consciousness, and everywhere there is evidence of nerve
substance and neural agency supporting consciousness.
But it is not this which I am writing to tell the readers
of BEAIN. The point which I wish to enforce is, that with
a psychology such as I have criticised, a psychology based
on the immaterial entity Mind, neurology is cut off from any
direct connection with philosophy. For then nerve substance
is no longer conceived as the proximate real condition of
consciousness, but an immaterial, and, therefore, totally
heterogeneous substance is introduced, which cannot be
brought into intelligible relation either with consciousness
or with nerve, seeing that there is nothing definite or
positive about it. The real and direct connection between
nerve and consciousness is severed, and nothing remains but
the ideal and indirect one through matter generally, matter
itself being regarded as a creation, possibly illusory, of the
mental powers. Psychology, pursued as it is at present
pursued by the greater number of its most approved
professors in this country, is not only a heterogeneous
member in the series of the sciences, but also tends, from
the nature of the entity which it assumes as its basis, to
swallow up all other sciences, and exhibit them as subor-
dinate departments of itself. For if everything material
is the creation of mind and has no other than an ideal exis-
tence, the nature and laws of everything material can only
be understood, in the last resort, by referring them to
the nature and laws of mind, that is, by the science of
psychology.
Before concluding I would recur once more to the
primary distinction between Knowing and Being, which
alone enables us to bring the several sciences into a single
unified scheme. I do so because the distinction is not one
that lies on the surface, and it is therefore worth while to
mention the special characteristic which enables it to serve
as the basis of philosophy. The essential point in that
distinction, as opposed to the distinctions between Mind and
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Body, or Subject and Object, is this, that the Knowing
includes no real agency, though it is open to proof of
involving it if such proof should be at any time forthcoming,
whereas Mind and Subject, both of them, imply real agency,
inherent either in consciousness itself or in the being who
possesses it. This is an assumption which as an initial
assumption is illicit, since it is not a self-evident fact; and
whoever is permitted to make it unchallenged may with
equal justice demand, that its special nature shall also be
assumed on the sole warrant of his assertion; whereby the
door is opened to fictions without end.
It is understood and admitted on all hands that Being
or Existence, to be recognised at all, must in some way or
other be present in consciousness, must be an object of
knowing in some general sense. But this does not require
that the consciousness or the knowing should itself be
known as an existent or as having agency in it or at back of it.
In other words, it is consciousness simply as knowing which
is the first and only strictly necessary implication in all
knowledge of Being or Existence. That alone is the source
whence all our knowledge of Being, Existence, Agency,
Genesis, and so on, is derived. It is true that, when we
have derived this knowledge from it, we see that conscious-
ness must itself exist, and therefore have some agency
either in it or at back of it, in order to be a Knowing at all.
But this knowledge is subsequent to the knowledge which
is a process-content of consciousness simply, not given in
and with the primary knowing, since it pre-supposes repeated
comparisons between many different parts or contents of it.
And from comparison is also derived the still more par-
ticular knowledge, what kinds of phenomena are found
capable of standing in the relation of real conditions to
others. Hence arises the well-known philosophical axiom,
that the order of knowledge and the order of existence
are opposite in direction, or, as it is sometimes loosely
stated, what is first in order of existence may be last in
order of knowledge, and vice versa.
The particular knowledge of the material world, of
physical agencies in it, of nerve substance and agency, and
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of their close relation to consciousness taken as an existent,
are also derivatives of comparison, and are facts of experience
having positive evidence in their favour. Immaterial sub-
stances, on the contrary, and agencies inherent in them,
and agencies inherent in consciousness itself, either as an
existent or as a knowing, are things which, so far as I know,
have no positive evidence in their favour, are conceptions
derived from early forms of thought and speculation handed
down by tradition, and can now be retained in science and
in philosophy only on the (assumed) footing of self-evident
factors in primary experience.
The psychologists who retain these ideas seem to me
purposely to avoid coming face to face with the fundamental
question in psychology, as it is in every positive science,
what is the nature, and where the seat, of the agency
proximately concerned in the phenomena which belong to
the science, and the laws of which it is the purpose of the
science to discover. They adopt, not a working hypothesis
which can be brought into explanatory connection with the
phenomena, but some words or phrases which will enable
them to go on writing and lecturing on the phenomena
without one ; which is a very different thing, and one which
never carries them beyond the descriptive department of the
^feience. In short, the Mind of which they speak is not a
vera causa, though they use it as one; while at the same
time they persistently avoid coming to any explanation on
the point.
The English distaste for anything speculative or meta-
physical assists them considerably in this procedure. The
analysis of consciousness simply as a knowing, and the
connection of consciousness with nerve substance as its
only positively known Subject, are two lines of thought
which are natural allies and closely inter-dependent. But
the alliance between them will remain in posse, so long as
the present school of psychologists can continue to persuade
men of science, and especially neurologists, that the proper
business of philosophy is, not to analyse consciousness, but
to enquire (inter alia) into the transcendental nature of Mind
and Mental Energy, while adopting them as phenomenal
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realities on the assurance of the psychologists. This re-
markable mis-representation of the sphere of philosophy
depends partly on supposing that there can be any reality
which is not phenomenal (a supposition due to adopting the
distinction between appearance and reahty as primary and
self-evident), and partly on confusing phenomenal realities
with the crude conceptions of common aense. It is the
psychologist's own business to see that he avoids incor-
porating the latter into his scientific theory. He cannot
be permitted to give them rank as scientific hypotheses, and
then call upon philosophy to vindicate their reahty.
VOL. XIV
